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Review of Wilfred Beckerman’s Economics as applied ethics:
value judgements in welfare economics. London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011, 240 pp.
JONATHAN B. WIGHT
University of Richmond
This is a well-written textbook geared to advanced undergraduate or
graduate students of economics, many of whom are largely and
regrettably innocent of the ethical problems inherent in conventional
economic analysis. It compares with Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S.
McPherson’s Economic analysis, moral philosophy, and public policy
(2006) and Johan J. Graafland’s Economics, ethics, and the market:
introduction and applications (2007). The book presupposes a fair
amount of knowledge in both economics and ethics (it does not intend
to be a primer in either). The author is professor emeritus at Balliol
College, Oxford and honorary visiting professor of economics at
University College London, and this book arose from a third-year course
at the latter school in which he participated.
The book contains 17 chapters, each of them reasonably concise
(ranging from 8 pages to 24 pages). Each chapter could thus be covered
on a single day or two in class. The topics are generally what one would
expect: the fact-value dichotomy; getting from individual choices to
individual welfare and from individual welfare to social welfare;
utilitarianism and its critics; GDP; happiness; equality; justice; the value
of life; and the bounds of moral standing in space and time (e.g.,
international and inter-generational welfare).
The author is dissatisfied with the standard way of teaching
economics, which supposes that one can do policy making without
carefully addressing ethical precepts. Another frustration with current
economic teaching is the focus on optimality rather than on
understanding our actual, second-best, starting position. The book
attempts to demonstrate, in chapter 1, the mix of value judgments
with facts necessary for welfare economics. Two examples are provided,
one of natural resource depletion and the other of global warming.
Citing Ian Little, Beckerman notes that in both cases finding a unique
optimum solution is impossible given that ethical choices dominate
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any conclusion. Hence, “‘Optimal’ does not mean ‘ethical’” (p. 11). In
addition, I would add that historical, cultural, and political frameworks
create institutional regimes with path dependencies that are important
for policy analysis and that go far beyond the scope of efficiency
analysis. Dani Rodrik’s One economics, many recipes: globalization,
institutions, and economic growth (2007) is suggestive of what can and
should be done to incorporate some of these elements.
Beckerman does not do all that he could with the fact-value
dichotomy. For example, he accepts that scientific propositions
in positive economics depend upon factual observations. But an
unexamined issue in the book is how values are used to create the
very facts that are presented as scientific. For example, the “fact” that
the unemployment rate is 7% depends in part on the value judgments
that go into the official definition of who is “unemployed”. A looser
definition could produce policies that result in more fiscal stimulus
and more people on welfare rolls. In economics, definitional terms are
socially created and they reflect professional judgments mixed with
moral and political norms.
Chapter 3 discusses the trade-offs between policy goals, such as low
inflation and low unemployment. The point is to demonstrate that “both
value judgments and positive propositions must enter, sooner or later,
into any specific normative economics prescription” (p. 33). In many
instances the ethical judgments in welfare economics are “not always
adequately appreciated” (p. 33)—which is likely an understatement.
In my own experience, colleagues have argued that once a value
proposition is widely adopted it is no longer “ethical” it is objectively
“professional”. This is misguided. For example, a professional norm
in econometrics is to accept a Type I error rate of 5 percent, i.e., which
produces false positives in 5 out of 100 cases. However, the loss
function for a Type I error varies greatly depending on the
circumstances. If a food additive is suspected of causing serious brain
injury in children, would one prefer to make fewer false positives in this
case, compared to when the loss involves merely an upset stomach?
There is no objective answer to this question because the choice
requires a value judgment. Establishing a professional norm cannot
diminish the ethical significance of what is at stake.
Using David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s writings, Beckerman adeptly
demonstrates that ethical analysis in economics has deep historical
roots. In introducing altruism and benevolent sympathy he cites the
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familiar opening sentence from Adam Smith’s The theory of moral
sentiments (1759):
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others,
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it (Smith TMS, I.i.1).
Yet readers should be aware that Smith was also interested in antisocial instincts for hatred and revenge that play an important part in
the development of institutions of justice.
In chapter 4, on social welfare functions, Beckerman laments that
standard microeconomics insists that no interpersonal comparisons of
utility can be valid. While the neoclassical approach is scientifically
logical, it defies our moral intuitions: a loaf of bread taken from a
plump person and given to a starving child would certainly increase
human welfare in the minds of most people, even if there is no way
of proving this. Given the growing interplay between economics and
biology, there may indeed be ways to calculate substantive measures
(e.g., hormonal responses) of well-being in the future. Beckerman notes,
using the wry humour that peppers the book:
We all know that to rule out interpersonal comparisons of this kind
simply because there is no scientific basis for them is nonsense.
Rigour is extremely important, but it must not be allowed to become
‘rigor mortis’. If we were unable to empathize with other people
sufficiently for us to be able to make fairly sound judgements
about significant differences in levels of utility, the social concepts
of fairness that are essential in any stable society would be
impossible (p. 62).
To Beckerman, making “rough interpersonal comparisons” between
utilities can be justified in specific circumstances.
Beckerman addresses the limitations of Larry Summers’s famous
memorandum on exporting pollution to impoverished African
countries.1 He rightly points out the distributional as well as principalagent problems with Summers’s proposal, and the fact that
compensation for pollution victims is unlikely. But he might also have
pointed out that there are few institutional safeguards in the countries
1

This was part of an internal memo on trade liberalization circulated in December
1991, while Summers was chief economist at the World Bank, and which was published
in The Economist, 8th February 1992.
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concerned, whether for legal redress or political protest. In other words,
Summers (like most economic analysts) assumes the existence of
functioning institutions that are essential for justifying the implicit
coercion that lies behind modern cost-benefit calculations. The Chinese
government forcibly relocated 1 million peasants to build the Three
Gorges Dam based on purported economic benefits and costs. But
opportunity costs cannot be calculated in involuntary transactions,
and without judicial restraints, a free press, and a democratic process,
these estimates are not subject to impartial checks. In a Hobbesian
world, coercion is justified only when the contractual basis for coercion
is voluntarily agreed to ahead of time.
Ultimately, Beckerman is sanguine about the role of cost-benefit
analysis in the economic toolkit:
It might appear from the above that welfare economics cannot take
us very far in making rational choices among different policy
options. But this would be a mistake. Welfare economics, combined
with the social welfare function, provides a valuable framework and
organizing principle for taking account of the effect of any economic
policy (p. 76).
Because most policy choices are about marginal adjustments to
resource allocations, “what is usually required will be factual
information, and there will be little point in wringing one’s hands
over the normative significance of the starting point” (pp. 76-77).
Nevertheless, a sterile cost-benefit analysis that fails to adequately
address ethical values may become a harmful activity.
Overall, this book is highly recommended. It covers the selected
topics with depth and sensitivity. The writing is generally excellent,
but there are occasions of repetition and unevenness, as if the chapters
were compiled separately and merged later. A student reader who is not
already familiar with basic ethical theories could benefit from a primer
in some places. For example, the book discusses Amartya Sen’s theory
of commitment, however it does not dig very deeply to explain or
defend that notion, whether from a deontological or virtue ethics
approach.
The book devotes a lot of attention to questions of equality and
justice, particularly on the work of economist philosophers such as
John Broome, Partha Dasgupta, Ian Little, and Amartya Sen. This is
appropriate, interesting, and relevant. However, the book does not
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appear to address research in experimental economics, biology, and
psychology that might be relevant to some of these questions, such as
the work in neuroeconomics by Paul Zak, experimental work by Vernon
Smith, or recent philosophical work on virtue ethics by Deirdre
McCloskey. This is the normal limitation of any text that strives to be
concise, yet students should understand there is much more to ethics
and economics than can be conveyed in this book.
In particular, if economics is applied ethics, as the title suggests,
economists themselves must be ethical in the pursuit of science.
However, the book does not address the moral responsibilities of being
a scientist, nor does it address the conflicts of interest of economists
before and during the crisis of 2008 (as alleged in the documentary,
Inside job). These would seem to be important topics for economics
students but they lie beyond the scope of this work. As with the ethics
embedded in normative economics, the ethics embedded in positive
economics also remain generally unexamined.

REFERENCES
Graafland, Johan J. 2007. Economics, ethics, and the market: introduction and
applications. New York: Routledge.
Hausman, Daniel M., and Michael S. McPherson. 2006 [1996]. Economic analysis, moral
philosophy, and public policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One economics, many recipes: globalization, institutions, and
economic growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Smith, Adam. 1790 [1759]. The theory of moral sentiments [TMS]. London: A. Millar.
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS.html (accessed April 2013).

Jonathan B. Wight is professor of economics at the University of
Richmond. He is the author of the academic novel, Saving Adam Smith:
a tale of wealth, transformation, and virtue (2002); and a book of lessons
on ethics and economics for teachers, Teaching the ethical foundations
of economics (2007, co-edited with John S. Morton). He currently serves
as president of the Association for Social Economics.
Contact e-mail: <jwight@richmond.edu>

VOLUME 6, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2013

126

